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No. 20090566-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SIDNEY EWING and CATHIE EWING, 
individually and on behalf of the Estate of Rayn Ewing, deceased, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
STATE OF UTAH'S AND U T A H DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S 
A N S W E R B R I E F 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from the Ewings' wrongful death suit against the 
State of Utah and the Utah Department of Transportation, collectively 
"UDOT." The district court entered an order granting UDOT's motion for 
summary judgment and certifying it as final. Case No. 080925951, R. 101-
03.1 The Ewings timely appealed. R. 131-32. This Court has jurisdiction 
1
 The district court consolidated the Ewings' case (Case No. 
090902418) with Case No. 080925951. Unless otherwise indicated, all record 
cites refer to the consolidated case, No. 080925951. 
over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4) (West Supp. 2009), 
providing this Court with jurisdiction over cases transferred from the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
The Savings Statute 
The savings statute provides that if a timely-filed action fails on non-
substantive grounds, and if "the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the action has expired," a plaintiff may file a second action 
within one year after the first action failed. Here, the Ewings' first action 
failed on non-substantive grounds before the statute of limitation expired, but 
they filed their second suit after it expired. Did the district court correctly 
dismiss the second suit because it was time barred? 
A. Standard of review 
Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court "review[s] the trial court's 
-2-
summary judgment for correctness, considering only whether the trial court 
correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of 
material fact existed." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, <J[ 10, 48 P.3d 235. 
The Court reviews a district court's interpretation of a statute for 
correctness. Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 2002 UT 44,18, 48 P.3d 949. 
B. Preservation of issue 
The Ewings raised this issue in opposition to UDOT's motion for 
summary judgment, R. 65-69, and in a supplemental memorandum. R. 78-82. 
UDOT responded in its reply memoranda. R. 72-74, R. 88-90. After 
argument, R. 142 (Transcript of hearing), the district court entered an order 
granting UDOT's motion for summary judgment and certifying it as final. 
R. 101-103. A copy of that order is attached as Addendum A. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111, which provides: 
(1) If any action is timely filed and the judgment for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in the action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and 
the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
-3-
(2) On and after December 31, 2007, a new action may be commenced 
under this section only once. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Ewings filed a wrongful death action against UDOT claiming that 
UDOT's negligence caused their daughter's death. The district court ruled 
that the applicable statute of limitation barred the Ewings' complaint and 
that the savings statute did not apply. The Ewings appeal that ruling. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The Ewings sued UDOT on February 12, 2009. Case No. 090902418. R. 
1. The district court consolidated the case with Paget v. State of Utah, et aL, 
No. 080925951, by order entered on March 30, 2009. R. 53-55. 
After consolidation, UDOT moved for summary judgment against the 
Ewings. R. 56. The Ewings opposed the motion, and it was fully briefed. R. 
58-60, R. 65-69, R. 72-74, R. 78-82; R. 88-90. The district court heard oral 
argument on May 29, 2009, and granted UDOT's summary judgment 
motion. R. 93, R. 142 (Transcript of hearing p. 24). The district court entered 
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an order granting the motion and certifying the judgment as final on -Tune 23, 
""iI II I ill.!!11 I l l ) - 0 3 . 
The Ewings timely appealed on July 2, 2009. R 1°1 32. The I Jtah 
Supreme \ '"mini irmi.slei reil (lie case lo Mm. (law. • *> .»i.- t ettective August 3, 
' - > « I O « I Iii!!"1 I ! l < > II I II , III11 II H . 
STATEMENT OF J 
~hi January 21, 2007, Rayn Ewing, plaintiffs' daughter, was driving on 
Interstate 80 in Parley's canyon. Case No. 090902418, R. 3. At the same 
- ;..i:iu. f <- • A.i:- ,.nvni& w., , s' .,, -OP opposite director *™~ 
'*»!!<. renl M»I of Ii4i«' < MF1, --I'O^'^MI f It-11 * "illi »• »iied"'j"i, "HHI enlered I he opposite 
io:*^. u raser collided with Rayn Ewing's car and another car operated by 
Annette Paget P 3, Case No. 090902418, R. 3. Rayn sustained serious 
MIJUI ii - and la in un-u * .i ^ Jc 000002418, R. 3 
Rayn's parents, plaintiffs here,, filed a notice of claim on December 11, 
MM1 ' l"" ' n, i \t- "" \mnmj, I Ih, !! subsequently, on June .1008, the 
Ewings filed a •wrongful deal 11 « iiiiiil igainsl 111)1 >T i Tim ill 1 li,"l 11 rl I "mi m I n 
Annette Paget also suffered serious ii iji II ies a nd lit Br pa ssengei , 
daughter Alexis, died. R. *. 
5 
Summit County. R. 59, 64. The Ewings claimed that UDOT was negligent in 
failing to provide a median barrier and in maintaining a safe road. Case No. 
090902418, R. 1-8. 
UDOT moved to dismiss the Summit County suit for improper venue, 
and the Ewings voluntarily dismissed that suit on September 4, 2008. R. 59, 
64. At the time the Summit County court dismissed the case, neither the 
two-year statute of limitation for wrongful death nor the one-year statute of 
limitation for actions under the governmental immunity act had run. R. 59. 
The Ewings then filed a second action against UDOT in Salt Lake 
County on February 12, 2009. Case No. 090902418, R. 1. At the time of 
filing, both statutes of limitation had run. R. 59. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Binding precedent from this Court holds that the savings statute 
operates to save causes of action that would otherwise be untimely if three 
requirements are met: 1) the first action must have been timely filed; 2) the 
first action must have failed on non-substantive grounds; and 3) the statute of 
limitation for the first action must have expired before it failed. Here, the 
savings statute did not apply because the third requirement is not satisfied. 
-6-
i in.* hwui^s tir hi wrongful death suit was timely filed and failed on non-
substantive grounds, .MM Un: antrt dismissed that action before the applicable 
sta ti ite • o f limitation expii eel Bi II t , \ 1 lei :i tl i e Ew ii igs filed their second action 
agai i is l 1 IDO'T", in „n \\ fivo iimnf hs l.'Hoi , l l l i r (IIIIIH1 h.nl i iiiii T in listen I MII IL 
correctly dismissed the second untimely suit. 
Aw-HiviKN'r 
The statute of limitation barred the second complaint because 
the savings statute did not apply. 
The district court properly dismissed the Swings' complaint because 
they filed it after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitation. 
Despite ttie fcw nigs' characterization of this case as an improper application 
el i he mi in 111111 III in 1 \" .n l"". IiiiiilnLioii pound, I ins case is not aw iimiiu.iii> case at 
alL Ai ti i * : I • ; i - • *• -' . * of limit; 11 i < in i i 11 i 11 n • s , 1 1 1 | 111, 11 ' i » 1 1 1 1 1 1 *" 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 III I v < i <' t , 3 
the case turns on the application oi the savings statute. UDOT i l a s never 
argued that the savings statute does not apply to actions brought under the 
3
"! Jtah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(2)(b) (West Sujip. J(h ^ .dos thai, -i 
plaintiff must file an action within one year after f ho dor - n< »i in* of 
claim. 
i 
immunity act. Instead, UDOT's position is that the savings statute did not 
apply in this particular case. 
This appeal addresses only when the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-2-111, operates to save an otherwise untimely action. The case thus 
turns on the proper statutory interpretation. The district court correctly 
found that the savings statute did not apply, and this Court should affirm. 
A. Stare decisis compels the conclusion that the savings statute 
does not apply. 
Prior cases from this Court have already held that the savings statute 
applies only when the applicable statute of limitation expired before the court 
dismissed the case. Callahan v. Sheaffer, 877 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah App. 
1994); Hansen v. Dep't of Fin. Inst, 858 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah App. 1993); 
Moffitt v. Rarr, 837 P.2d 572, 573 (Utah App. 1992). The district court was 
bound to follow that precedent. See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1269 (Utah 1993). The rule of stare decisis is a cornerstone of American 
jurisprudence that is "crucial to the predictability of the law and fairness of 
adjudication." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). As a result, 
-8-
"[tjhose asking [courts] to overturn prior precedent have a substantial 
burden of persuasion." Id. at 398 
Here, the Ewings fail to acknowledge that prior, controlling precedent, 
except to cite Hansen and to state tha t the "authority appears to be 
misplaced ' Aplt's Brief at p 'i But for this Court to reverse the district 
i mil I Ii le would icqum" il, In uvei i ule iliitv' pi im i ascs t'»ii< li <i sit1)* is nevei 
done light! y and is done only when the "decision is clearly erroneoi is 01 • 
conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" 
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3 (quoting State v. Dugan, 718 R2d 1010, 101/! 
I/ \i iz M)8(i>). 
rl'he Kwin^.s have not adequately argued or explain u why the Court 
.shmilil mi it'iile 11 IN ^  prim Inn mil raises Their passing inenl inn lli.il leliaiiee 
on Hansen migh1 be misplaced "does not even approach the high ba r 
required to override stare decisis." City ofHilldale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 5 6 , 1 
36, 28 I '.3d 697 See also State v. Eisner, 2001 TTT 99, % HI, 37 P 3d 1073 
0 mil I v1'! mild iiiii ilisl in It stare derisri when argument was merely that 
manslaughter instruction was "Yonftisintf) Sfukn e \m ivoif/i 785 P'M 
417, 427 (Utah 1990) (overruling precedent unlikely where briefing is 
inadequate and facts do not lemand it) 
This Court's prior decisions bound the district court. The Ewings have 
not satisfied their substantial burden of overcoming stare decisis. That being 
the case, this Court need go no further in order to affirm the district court. 
B. The statute's plain language compels the conclusion that the 
savings statute does not apply. 
Should this Court decide to review its prior precedent, the district court 
correctly construed the savings statute to conclude that it did not apply here. 
When this Court interprets any statute, the Court seeks "to give effect to the 
purpose and intent of the legislature." Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, f 22, 212 
P.3d 547. The rules of statutory construction require the Court to look first 
"to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language, 
unless the language is ambiguous." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at % 12. And the 
Court gives "effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning." Pace v. St. George City Police Dep% 2006 UT App. 494, f 6, 153 
P.3d 789; Hoyer, 2009 UT 38 at f 22. 
Here, the savings statute's plain wording did not operate to save the 
Ewings' untimely complaint. That statute is designed to protect plaintiffs 
from dismissals without prejudice because the limitation period has expired 
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before the court enters the dismissal, in other words, despite being a 
dismissal withonl prejudice, the plaintiff would be barred from re-filing f 
action because the limitation period expired: 
If any action is timely filed and . the plaintiff fails 
in the action or upon a cause of action otherwise than 
upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
by contract for commencing the action has expired, 
the plaintiff. . . may commence a nev ui :<>- within 
one year after the reversal or failure 
U tali Code An i i § " 1 8B 2 ] li I < West hup),. . dU:- d dit;< itniily. an 
otl i erv ise i mti mely a ction is ^ ; -
 c * < * i - * • i t. 
1) the original action was timely iiled; 2) the action failed for reasoiib not uu 
the merits; and 3) the limitation period for the action expired before the 
original action failed. 
This Court has explained that the "savings s tatute 'permits a plaintiff 
whose action ha;* ^ u ^ dismissed on non-substantive grounds Ut nit-, a new 
I H'iiipl.iiiil \niliiii mil \r,ti oi llh'd«ilrul dismissal, il (In liiiiiii -. nil h.i I 
vjccurred after the statute of limitations ' xt Ja in tiffs action has run™ 
Callahan Sheaffer. 877 P.2d 1259, 2 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Mo//:!t 
" *?.— c i ^u
 t,f j,t 573 (Utah Apr 1 °92)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
- : , • ! . . , ,\,..., .... la tutoiv . nn iaUaa liad v:xpi.< 1 
prevented] the invocation of the savings statute." Hansen v. Dep't of Fin. 
Inst, 858 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis added). 
The Ewings neither cite to nor acknowledge Callahan and Moffitt. And 
without explanation, the Ewings argue that reliance on Hansen is 
unwarranted. But this Court's recognition in those cases of the statute's 
function is more than mere dicta. Instead, and in each case, the Court 
interpreted the statute to determine whether and how it applied. Both UDOT 
and the district court applied the statute in this case consistent with this 
Court's prior case law. 
Here, the savings statute does not apply to the Ewings' action. 
Although their first action was timely filed and failed on a ground other than 
the merits, neither the statute of limitation for wrongful death actions nor the 
statute of limitation for filing an action under the immunity act had expired 
before the Summit County court dismissed the first action. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 7SB-2-304(2), 63G-7-403(2)(b). Thus, the Ewings did not satisfy the 
savings statute's third requirement. They still had time under both statutes 
of limitation to file their second action. As that was the case, the Ewings' 
action did not need to be "saved." 
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Even were there no precedent for interpreting the statute,4 the 
Ewings' construction renders the saving statute's third requirement 
ctlecuvely inoperative or superfluous. %AHO interpretation which renders 
(Kiibi * iid : i ii slaiiilt- iiiofmraiiw ui .Mipi-rlhimi.^ in I i In1 ab ided " Sin 
v. Hun 906 P.2d 311, 312 vULah 1985). If, as the Ewings argue,,5 "th e i ime 
4
 Courts 1 re >m c itiic >r jur isdicti* <* ;: : : J * <i "< J their sa\ ings statutes th e 
same way. In Br wrier v. Sobel, 961 P.2u o u vUkla. 1998), the court 
interpreted the statute to apply only "in those situations where the 
applicable statute of limitations expired or ran during the pendency of the 
first action." Bruner, 961 P.2d at 81 7 The court explained why it 
interpreted the statute tha t way: "The obvious reason this Court had so 
ruled was because the language of § 100, 'and the time limited for the same 
shall have expired', modified the immediately preceding phrase of th*-
statute, i.e. that language stating the first action failed otherwise than u 
the merits." Id. The Oklahoma statute, prior to amendrront, ^"^' -ir*- ,
 v 
identical to Utah's statute: 
If any action be commenced within due time, and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff be reversed, .»r if the plaintiff fail in such 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and : *ie time limited for 
the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he die, and the 
cause of action survive, his representatives [J may commence a 
new action within one year after the reversal or fai lure. 
1 2 ( IS , 1971, § 1 00 (emphasis added); s< •< • also Bloom v. in •>(>, WL 
4206604, *2 n.3 iD. Kan. 2007) (savings statute not appl icant because inu: 
had not expired when the state court dismissed the plaintiffs claims withoi 
prejudice."); Elzea v. Perry, 12 S.W.3d 213, 216 (Ark. 2000) (since original 
statute of limitations had not expired, savings s tatute was "simply 
irrelevant."). 
t hi/: E w i n g ; - h.*1 t :,-•» | 
. laiuu of limitation controller *>. u^, 
!nw or r o n t r a c t h a s »'^  s <\v '*V* oforvt •<! i 
- . i n , in* Wf u i i g h - • h .i • 
e "time limited eilhc i i./ 
^second romnhiin< WM. 
-13 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the action has expired" 
refers not to the date that the case is dismissed, but instead to the date that 
the second action is filed, that language has no meaning. If the first action 
was timely and dismissed on non-substantive grounds, then the plaintiffs 
would have a year from the dismissal to re-file. Put differently, the limitation 
period would be tolled for one year. But the statute is not a tolling statute 
and to construe it that way runs contrary to the statute's plain wording. If 
the legislature intended to enact a tolling statute, the statute could have been 
written without the third requirement. 
"It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if 
possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute . . . No clause [,] 
sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the 
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all of the 
words of the statute." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App. 304, f 11, 169 P.3d 
778 (quoting State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 52, 63 P.3d 621)(alterations in 
original); see also Hoyer, 2009 UT 38 at f 22. This Court will thus avoid 
constructions that render words or parts of statutes meaningless. But the 
filed. Arguments made for the first time on appeal will not be considered by 
the Court. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, il 9, 
70 P.3d 904; Turtle Mgmt. v. Haggis Mgmt., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). 
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Ewings5 construction does precisely ti lat. ' I he district court correctly 
recognized at oral argument that "[i]n order to reach the result [E wings' 
counsel] urges, 1 would have to essentially, I believe, ignore the language that 
we focused m hero on and that is "and the time limited either by law or 
("ii i i i i.n i Inn ( nmiuoi i i in;.?, tin <u luiiiii has r x | i u n l II" I I '" i I i au »i I(I( ( 
1 i ea l i i i g a t p 23) 6 
T i n mi I iL1 ii'ii I iiiiiiil i i m p i ' i l ' , (ot lnvn nil (ho n i n l i n l h m ' lavs "ininl! I ho 
statute's plain wording to determine that it did not apply to the Ewings' 
second eomplaint The applicable s tatute of limitation, whether that for 
wrongful ueath m thai for filing an action under Uu: immunity act, na*. nut 
i-x(--: > *i* a>i< • r •' igs'fi i st a ction . - i - : .« • 
r • t :: timely file the * -n J action. Thus, i b - Ewings 
could not invoke ihe protections of the savings statute to save their second 
\ t argument, the I«Jv\nii»s counsel chose to iernoro tin- u 
requir n^nl "if we take out the one line, '|a]nd the- time limitea oy law or 
contra u-i commencing the action has expired."' H 1 VI ^ .Transcript of 
hearing at p. 17), and continued, "The legislature >aid, look, if you file timely 
and something happens that's not uu the merits - the judge hasn't said Fin 
dismissing it on the merits, a jury hasn' t decided it on the merits, it fails for 
another reason like voluntary dismissal then we're going to give you an 
extra year of tim- "'The State is trying to say, .veil that is qualified by 
this one little language that talks about the commencait >f the action." R. 
142 (Transcript of hearing at p I ^ ' I adeod, counsel was right, that "one 
little language" adds a third requirement to the statute's application that 
cannot be ignored. 
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untimely complaint. Their briefs discussion about the reasons for the 
savings statute are neither relevant nor helpful. By its very terms, the 
savings statute did not apply here. The district court correctly found that the 
Ewings' action was untimely when filed and that court properly granted 
UDOT's motion for summary judgment. This Court should affirm the 
district court's decision. 
C. Without the savings statute, the complaint is barred. 
Having correctly concluded that the savings statute did not apply here, 
the district court properly dismissed the Ewings' complaint as untimely. 
The Ewings spend much of their brief discussing general immunity act 
provisions and argue that because their notice of claim was proper and timely 
filed, the district court erred by not allowing their complaint to proceed. The 
discussion and that argument miss the mark. 
This case involves the simple application of a limitation period. 
Specifically, one of two found in the immunity act. A person who has a claim 
against a governmental entity must strictly comply with each critical 
deadline. First, the claimant must file a pre-suit notice of claim within one 
year after the claim arose. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-402 (West Supp. 2009). 
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If the governmental entity fails to approve or deny the claim sixty days after 
its filing, the claim is deemed denied by operation of law at the end of that 
period. Id. at § 63G-7-403(l)(b). The second deadline requires the claimant to 
file suit within one year after the denial of the claim. Id. at § 63G-7-403(2)(b). 
This Court addressed and strictly applied those deadlines in Harward 
v. Utah County, 2000 UT App. 222, ff 7-8, 6 P.3d 1140. There, the plaintiff 
timely filed a notice of claim on June 6, 1996. Id. at f 5. The county neither 
approved nor denied the claim by the end of the 90-day period in effect at the 
time, so the claim was deemed denied on September 4, 1996. Id. The 
plaintiff filed suit on September 5, 1997, one year and one day after the date 
that the claim was denied. Id. The trial court held that the lawsuit was 
time-barred and granted summary judgment. Id. This Court affirmed 
because the plaintiff failed to file suit on or before the one-year deadline. Id. 
at I 8. 
Harward controls here because the savings statute does not apply. The 
Ewings filed their notice of claim on December 11, 2007. Neither UDOT nor 
its insurer responded to the notice and it was deemed denied by operation of 
law on February 9, 2008. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(l)(b). Accordingly, 
the one year limitation provision required the Ewings to file suit against 
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UDOT no later than February 8, 2009. But they commenced this action on 
February 12, 2009, after the limitation period expired. 
Any reliance on Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 
1974) and Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist., 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 is 
misplaced. In those cases, the court refused to apply the immunity act's 
one-year statute of limitation because the governmental entity lulled the 
plaintiffs into missing the limitation period. Neither applies here. UDOT did 
nothing to lull or trick the Ewings into filing late. See also Morales v. State, 
2007 UT App. 250, No. 20060593 (July 19, 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished 
decision) (state not estopped from raising limitation defense). The district 
court correctly dismissed the complaint because it was barred by the statute 
of limitation. This Court should affirm that decision. 
The result remains the same even if the Court applies the wrongful 
death statute of limitation as the Ewings now advocate. The limitation 
period for wrongful death is two years. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-304(2). The 
accident occurred on January 21, 2007. The limitation period therefore 
expired on January 20, 2009. The Ewings' second action was undisputedly 
filed after that time. See Aplt's Brief at p. 7. Thus, the time for the Ewings 
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to sue expired under either limitation period.7 The district court correctly 
ruled that the Ewings' complaint was untimely. This Court should affirm 
the district court in all respects. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly found that the Ewings' action was barred 
by the statute of limitation. Binding precedent compels that conclusion. But 
even if there were no precedent interpreting the savings statute, it did not 
apply here because the court dismissed the Ewings' first action before the 
statute of limitation for their cause of action expired. The Ewings' could not 
invoke the savings statute's protection because their action did not need to 
be saved. This Court should affirm. 
Dated this _5 day of November, 2009. 
PEGGY E.STONE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah and Utah 
Department of Transportation 
7
 Case law suggests that the Ewings were required to comply with both 
limitation periods. See, e.g., Hall v. Utah State Dept ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, 
24 P.3d 958 (plaintiff had to comply with time periods under both 
Whistleblower statute and governmental immunity act). 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY PAGET, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION and JOHN DOES 
I through 10, 
Defendants. 
SIDNEY EWING, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING UDOT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
EWING PLAINTIFFS 
Case No. 080925951 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Defendant State of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation ('TJDOT") moved for 
summary judgment against plaintiffs Sidney Ewing, Cathie Ewing and the Estate of Rayn Ewing 
("the Ewing plaintiffs"). The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and the Court 
heard argument on the motion. The Court granted the motion for the reasons stated in its May 
29, 2009 bench opinion. 
It is ordered: 
1. UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment Against the Ewing Plaintiffs is granted. 
2. The action filed by plaintiffs Sidney Ewing, Cathie Ewing and the Estate of Rayn 
Ewing against defendant State of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) is dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits. 
3. This order is certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). There is 
no factual overlap between the certified and remaining claims because the certified claims are 
dismissed based on the Ewing plaintiffs' failure timely to commence theii separate, but now 
consolidated, action against UDOT. There is no just reason to delay entry of a final order 
because UDOT's final legal status in the Ewing action need-fiot-rem^in indefinite while the 
Paget action is litigated. 
DATED this JJl 
Approved as to Form: 
James McConkie 
Attorney for the Ewing Plaintiffs 
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